State of Utah v. Carl Trujillo : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Carl Trujillo : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard M. Gallegos; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
Melvin C. Wilson; Kathi Sjoberg; Davis County Attorney; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Trujillo, No. 20000143 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2643
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs, 
CARL TRUJILLO 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20000143-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Judgment based on a conditional 
plea of guilty, pursuant to State v. Sery, to 
the offense of Theft, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404, in 
the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Davis County, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen 
presiding. 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
KATHI SJOBERG 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
(801) 451-4300 
(801) 451-4328 (FAX) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
RICHARD M. GALLEGOS 
3856 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 
(801) 627-1110 
(801) 627-1120 (FAX) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
CARL TRUJILLO 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20000143-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Judgment based on a conditional 
plea of guilty, pursuant to State v. Sery, to 
the offense of Theft, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404, in 
the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Davis County, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen 
presiding. 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
KATHI SJOBERG 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
(801) 451-4300 
(801) 451-4328 (FAX) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
RICHARD M. GALLEGOS 
3856 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 
(801) 627-1110 
(801) 627-1120 (FAX) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
THE DETENTION OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE AFTER A TRAFFIC 
STOP WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID BECAUSE IT WAS BASED 
UPON ARTICULABLE FACTS GIVING RISE TO A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THE DEFENDANT WAS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY. 
CONCLUSION 1 
ADDENDUM A 1 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State Cases 
Page(s) 
Citv of St. Georae v. Carter. 945 P.2d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 8 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660 
(1979) 7 
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed. 2d 229 
(1983) 8 
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133(Utah Ct. App. 1991) 9 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) 8 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127(Utah 1994) 7 
State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. App.) 4 
State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 4, 8 
State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 4 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 8 
State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 9 
Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968)8 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 4 
COURT RULES CITED 
None. 
3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Appellant asserts in his Brief that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress, 
finding that Deputy Jensen did not exceed the circumstances 
justifying the initial stop by further detaining defendant 
without articulating a reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. "The factual findings underlying a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence 
are reviewed under the deferential clearly-errcneous standard, 
and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a 
measures of discretion given to the trial judge's application of 
the legal standard to the facts." State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting, State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 
1247 (Utah Ct. App.) (Citing State v. Pena, 369 P.2d 932, 935-40 
(Utah 1994)), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By way of Information, Defendant was charged with Theft, a 
Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress which was heard by the trial 
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court on August 11, 1999, and denied on that same day. Defendant 
then entered a conditional guilty plea to Theft, a Class A 
misdemeanor, subject to the right to appeal the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress. The defendant entered his plea 
on December 1, 1999. On January 26, 2000, Defendant was 
sentenced. Defendant filed a Motion to Stay Execution of 
Sentence on March 8, 2000. Thereafter, on March 22, 2000, the 
trial court signed a Certificate of Probable Cause. Defendant 
filed Notice of Appeal on February 18, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 5, 1999, at approximately midnight, Deputy 
Jensen of the Davis County Sheriff's Office was on patrol in the 
area of Gentile Street and 1000 West in Layton. (R. 81, pp. 5-7). 
Deputy Jensen observed an older model Chevrolet sedan weaving in 
and out of the designated travel lane. The vehicle left its 
travel lane by a tire width several times while Deputy Jensen was 
following it. (R. 81, pp. 9, 34) Deputy Jensen observed the 
vehicle for a distance of less than one mile. (R. 81, p. 10) 
The vehicle then slowed down and pulled to the side of the road 
traveling at about five miles per hour for about 30 feet. It 
then pulled into a driveway and immediately backed out and drove 
up onto the curb. (R. 81, pp. 13, 37-38) Based on this driving 
pattern, Deputy Jensen believed the driver may have been impaired 
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by alcohol or drugs, so when the vehicle stopped, he pulled up 
behind it and activated his overhead lights. (R. 81, pp. 15-16) 
Deputy Jensen contacted the driver of the vehicle, Carl 
Trujillo, and explained his reason for the stop and asked for the 
defendant's driver's license and registration. Mr. Trujillo 
explained that he was visiting a friend at this address. (R. 81, 
pp.17-18, 41) Deputy Jensen noticed an odor of alcohol and was 
unsure if it was coming from the vehicle or from the defendant. 
He asked defendant if he had been drinking; defendant did admit 
to consuming one beer. (R. 81, pp. 19, 46) Deputy Jensen asked 
defendant to step from the vehicle and perform field sobriety 
tests. The results of the tests were consistent with defendant 
having consumed one beer. (R. 81, p.21). 
Defendant stated he had just come from work. His place of 
employment was very close to where he had stopped. (R. 81, p.22) 
Deputy Jensen did not ask where or when defendant had consumed 
the beer he admitted to drinking. (R. 81, pp. 21-22, 47-48) 
However, even though Deputy Jensen had determined that defendant 
was not under the influence of alcohol to a degree where he could 
not safely operate a vehicle, he was still concerned about where 
the alcohol was and where it had been consumed. Deputy Jensen 
believed the alcohol may be in the vehicle. (R. 81, pp. 23-24) 
Up to this point, the entire stop had lasted less than ten 
minutes. Deputy Jensen asked defendant if there was any alcohol 
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in the vehicle; defendant stated there was not. Deputy Jensen 
asked if he could look in the vehicle and defendant invited him 
to do 30. (R. 81, pp. 24-25, 50) Deputy Jensen then looked in 
the vehicle and found no alcohol, but found other evidence upon 
which the theft charge was based. 
At the time Deputy Jensen looked in the vehicle, he had no 
intent to arrest defendant for DUI; however, there was a 
possibility that he may issue a citation if alcohol was found in 
the vehicle. (R. 81, p. 27) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly ruled that Deputy Jensen's request 
to search the vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention. 
The search of defendant's vehicle was justified #nd supported by 
reasonable suspicion and also by defendant's consent to the 
search. Therefore, the t r i a l court 's ruling sltoai& be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DETENTION OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE AFTER A TRAFFIC 
STOP WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID BECAUSE IT WAS BASED 
UPON ARTICULABLE FACTS GIVING RISE TO A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THE DEFENDANT WAS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY. 
It has long been held that the stopping of a vehicle and 
detaining its occupants is a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 
1994)(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 
1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979)). In carrying out such a 
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stop, a law enforcement officer must meet a two part test. 
"First, the officer's initial stop must be justified; second, 
subsequent actions must be within the scope of the circumstances 
justifying the stop." State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) citing, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 
L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned 
that what the Fourth Amendment prohibits is unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said the "length and scope of the 
detention must be strictly tied to and justified by the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. State 
v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). In City of St. George 
v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court has said 
that "when a stop is made, the detention xmust be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop.'" Carter, at 169-70 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed. 2d 229 (1983)). After 
the officer has concluded the investigation related to the 
initial reason for the stop, any further detention must be based 
on "a reasonable suspicion based on specific, articulable facts 
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer 
at the time of the stop." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The officer then must ''diligently pursue a 
means of investigation that is likely to conform or dispel his 
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suspicions quickly.'' State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
In this case, there is no issue as to whether there was a 
valid reason to stop the vehicle. Our focus must be on the scope 
of the detention and its relation to the initial reason for the 
stop. Deputy Jensen stopped the defendant's vehicle because he 
thought the driver may be under the influence of alcohol. Once 
the stop was initiated, Deputy Jensen could detain defendant 
long enough to determine if defendant was in fact driving under 
the influence of alcohol. When he initially spoke with 
defendant, defendant admitted to drinking a beer. Deputy Jensen 
also could smell an odor of alcohol. These two facts were enough 
for Deputy Jensen to ask defendant to perform field sobriety 
tests to determine whether or not he was impaired to a degree 
where he could not operate a vehicle safely. After determining, 
based on defendant's performance on field sobriety tests, that 
defendant was not impaired to a degree where he could not operate 
a vehicle safely, it was not unreasonable for Officer Jensen tq| 
inquire further as to whether the defendant had any alcohol in 
the vehicle. The defendant had just left work, he admitted to 
drinking one beer. Usually people buy beer in six or twelve 
packs. Therefore, it was reasonable for the officer to believe 
the defendant may have had more beer in his possession. In order 
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to insure that defendant was not going to consume further alcohol 
and proceed to drive, Deputy Jensen was justified in asking to 
look in the vehicle to rule out the possibility of open 
containers in the vehicle. He asked for permission to search and 
it was granted. It was during this valid search that Deputy 
Jensen found, no open containers of alcohol, but evidence to 
support the charge of theft. 
CONCLUSION 
Deputy Jensen had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's 
vehicle. During the course of the stop, specific, articulable 
facts developed which justified defendant's further detention. 
Therefore, the trial court's decision should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ j day of January, 2001. 
tfathi Sjoberg|f ° V 
Deputy Daxis^younty (Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Richard M. Gallegos, Attorney for Appellant, 3856 Washington 
Blvd, Ogden, Utah 84403, this day of O^^A-^ , 2 00$. 
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ADDENDUM A 
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A. THAT'S CORRECT, I DID. 
Q. DID THE INCIDENT OCCUR ON THE 5TH OF FEBRUARY, 1999? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. WERE YOU ON DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. WHAT WAS YOUR SHIFT ON THAT DATE? 
A. MY SHIFT RAN FROM 6 P.M. ON THE 4TH TO 6 A.M. ON THE 
5TH. AND MY DUTY ASSIGNED AREA WAS WHAT WE REFER TO AS 
SECTOR ONE, AND THAT INCLUDES LAYTON, CLEARFIELD, SUNSET, 
SYRACUSE, ALL OF THE NORTHWESTERN AREA OF THE COUNTY. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF YOUR ASSIGNMENT? 
A. ONCE AGAIN, PATROL AND PARAMEDIC DUTIES IN THAT 
PARTICULAR SECTOR. 
Q. WERE YOU TRAVELING ALONE? 
A. YES, I WAS. 
Q. WHAT KIND OF VEHICLE? 
A. A MARKED SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT VEHICLE. 
Q. AND UP UNTIL THE MOMENT YOU HAD CONTACT WITH 
MR. TRUJILLO, HOW HAD YOUR SHIFT GONE? WHAT HAD BEEN 
HAPPENING? 
A. IT WAS RELATIVELY A SLOW EVENING. I WAS JUST DOING SOME 
ROUTINE PATROL DOWN ON THE WEST END OF GENTILE. WE HAVE 
SOME COUNTY AREA RESPONSIBILITIES DOWN IN THAT AREA. AND 
HAD COMPLETED THAT PATROL AND WAS EASTBOUND ON GENTILE. 
Q. WERE YOU LOOKING FOR ANYTHING IN -PARTICULAR? 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
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A. NOT NECESSARILY, NO. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. WHAT WAS YOUR STATE OF HEALTH AT THE TIME? 
A. PARDON ME? 
Q. YOUR STATE OF HEALTH? 
A. FINE. 
Q. YOUR --AT THE TIME? 
A. YEAH. 
Q. VISIBILITY? 
A. GREAT. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU WEREN'T FUNCTIONING UNDER ANY 
EXTRAORDINARY STRESS? 
A. NO, I DON'T BELIEVE SO. 
Q. NOW, YOU HAD CONTACT WITH MR. TRUJILLO. DO YOU 
RECOGNIZE HIM HERE IN THE COURTROOM TODAY? 
A. YES, I DO. YES, I DO. 
Q. AND HE WAS OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE? 
A. THAT IS CORRECT. 
Q. LET'S FOCUS ON -- ON THE TIME AND THE -- THE LOCATION. 
I'M NOT ASKING FOR DETAILS NOW, I'M JUST LAYING SOME 
FOUNDATION. 
A. OKAY. 
Q. THE LOCATION WHERE YOU SAW MR. TRUJILLO OPERATING A 
VEHICLE. 
A. WE WERE EASTBOUND ON GENTILE STREET AT APPROXIMATELY 
1000 WEST. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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Q. THAT'S LOCATED IN DAVIS COUNTY? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. IS IT WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS OF LAYTON, UTAH? 
A. IT'S ACTUALLY LAYTON CITY PROPER, YES. 
Q. APPROXIMATELY WHAT TIME? 
A. IT WAS APPROXIMATELY MIDNIGHT OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. 
Q. OKAY. DESCRIBE THE ENVIRONMENT. INCLUDE IN YOUR ANSWER 
WEATHER CONDITIONS, OTHER TRAFFIC, IF ANY, ANY SIGNIFICANT 
CIRCUMSTANCE. 
A. ACTUALLY IT WAS A VERY DARK NIGHT. THERE WAS NO WEATHER 
TO SPEAK OF SUCH AS RAIN OR SNOW OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. I 
DON'T RECALL WHETHER IT WAS OVERCAST OR NOT, BUT I DO RECALL 
IT WAS REASONABLY -- A REASONABLY DECENT EVENING WITH 
RESPECT TO WEATHER. COLD, OF COURSE, DURING THAT TIME OF 
YEAR, HOWEVER, NO SPECIFIC WEATHER THAT I RECALL. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE CONDITION OF THE ROADWAY? 
A. VERY DRY. 
Q. TRAFFIC? 
A. NO TRAFFIC TO SPEAK OF, THAT I RECALL. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT IN THE AREA? 
A. POSTED SPEED LIMIT ON GENTILE STREET AT THAT POINT I 
BELIEVE IS 3 5 MILES AN HOUR. 
Q. DESCRIBE THE LAYOUT OF THE ROADWAY IN THAT AREA. 
INCLUDE IN YOUR ANSWER THE APPROXIMATE WIDTH, HOW MANY LANES 
EACH WAY, ANY MARKING ON THE ROADWAY. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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A. IT LENT ITSELF TO THE IDEA OF POSSIBLE INTOXICATION, 
AGAIN. 
Q. EXPLAIN. 
A. WELL, PEOPLE DON'T TYPICALLY MAKE THOSE TYPES OF 
MOVEMENTS: INTO A DRIVEWAY, PULL BACK OUT, AND THEN DRIVE 
UP ONTO A CURB AND PARK THEIR VEHICLE. 
Q. WELL, WHAT ABOUT THE MARGIN FOR PARKING? WAS THERE 
ENOUGH MARGIN FOR A PERSON TO HAVE PROPERLY PARKED A 
VEHICLE? 
A. I'VE SEEN VEHICLES PARKED ON THAT STREET BEFORE, SO TO 
THAT I'D HAVE TO ANSWER YES. I MEAN --
Q. SO IN YOUR OPINION, IT WASN'T NECESSARY TO ENCROACH ON 
THE CURB --
A. NO. 
Q. -- FOR SAFETY REASONS? 
A. NO. 
Q. THERE WAS ADEQUATE MARGIN --
A. CERTAINLY. 
Q. --IN PLACE FOR PROPER PARKING WITHOUT GOING UP ON THE 
CURB? 
A. YES, I BELIEVE THAT'S TRUE. 
Q. DID -- DID YOU CAUSE MR. TRUJILLO TO BRING HIS VEHICLE 
TO A STOP? 
A. HE --
Q. HAD YOU -- HAD YOU ACTIVATED YOUR LIGHT? WERE YOU IN 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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THE PROCESS OF INITIATING A STOP? 
A. AS HE CAME TO REST ON THE CURB IS WHEN I PULLED UP 
BEHIND HIM AND ACTIVATED MY OVERHEAD LIGHTS. 
Q. SO YOU WERE ALREADY FOLLOWING HIM. 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. AND YOU DIDN'T DO ANYTHING TO CAUSE HIM TO BRING HIS 
VEHICLE TO A STOP. 
A. NOTHING PHYSICALLY. I -- I SLOWED DOWN TO OBSERVE HIS 
PATTERN AS WELL, BUT MY LIGHTS DID NOT COME ON AT THAT 
POINT. 
Q. HAD HE ALREADY BROUGHT HIS VEHICLE TO A STOP BEFORE YOU 
ACTIVATED YOUR LIGHTS? 
A. YES. 
Q. EXPLAIN NOW WHAT YOU DID. 
A. WELL, AT THE POINT OF ACTIVATING MY EMERGENCY LIGHTS, I 
CAME TO A STOP AS WELL AND EXITED MY PATROL CAR. WALKED 
FORWARD AND MADE CONTACT WITH MR. TRUJILLO AT HIS VEHICLE. 
Q. WAS THERE ANYONE WITH HIM? 
A. NO, HE WAS ALONE IN THE VEHICLE. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. EXPLAIN NOW YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM. PROVIDE 
AS MUCH DETAIL AS YOU CAN. INCLUDE IN YOUR ANSWER WHAT YOU 
SAID, IF ANYTHING, WHAT HE SAID, IF ANYTHING, WHAT YOU 
OBSERVED, WHAT YOU DID. 
A. WELL, MY INITIAL CONTACT, I EXPLAINED TO MR. TRUJILLO 
WHY I HAD STOPPED HIM, SPECIFICALLY THAT I HAD OBSERVED A 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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TOLD YOU HE WAS JUST OFF WORK. QUOTE HIM THE BEST YOU CAN. 
A. NOW, SAY THAT ONE MORE TIME. 
Q. WHEN HE GOT OFF -- WHEN HE TOLD YOU HE HAD COME FROM 
WORK. WHAT WERE HIS WORDS? 
A. HE HAD --HE HAD CLAIMED TO ME THAT HE HAD JUST GOTTEN 
OFF WORK AT SMITH'S WAREHOUSE AND HAD VISITED A FRIEND. 
AND, ONCE AGAIN, I DIDN'T ASK HIM HIS SHIFT -- WHAT TIME HIS 
SHIFT ENDED OR -- OR WHAT HAVE YOU, OR HOW LONG HE HAD BEEN 
OFF DUTY AT SMITH'S, BUT HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD JUST GOTTEN 
OFF WORK, IS WHAT HE SAID TO ME. 
Q. HE'D JUST GOT OFF WORK. AND HAD -- WHAT WOULD BE THE 
DISTANCE -- WHEN YOU FIRST SAW HIM DRIVING, WHAT WOULD BE 
THE DISTANCE FROM THE WAREHOUSE WHERE HE SAID HE WAS 
WORKING? 
A. OH, WE WERE -- SMITH'S WAREHOUSE IS ON SUGAR STREET AND 
WE WERE ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE TO A HALF A MILE EAST OF 
SUGAR STREET. 
Q. SO YOU'RE --
A. SO WE'RE TALKING A HALF MILE, A QUARTER OF A MILE FROM 
SMITH'S WAREHOUSE DURING THIS WHOLE SITUATION, THIS WHOLE 
STOP. 
Q. SO HE HAD TOLD YOU THAT HE HAD VISITED A FRIEND AND, 
ALSO, HE'D TOLD YOU HE WAS STOPPING TO SEE A FRIEND. 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. THEN LATER HE TOLD YOU THAT WHEN HE WAS STOPPING THAT HE 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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THAT THE DRIVING PATTERN WAS ERRATIC? 
A. WELL, IF -- IF WE'RE REFERRING TO MY REPORT, THE 
WRITTEN --
Q. WELL, NO, I'M NOT -- I'M NOT ACTUALLY REFERRING TO YOUR 
REPORT YET. I'M JUST ASKING YOU, YOU JUST STATED -- YOU 
KNOW, YOUR TESTIMONY JUST A FEW MINUTES AGO, MR. HARWARD 
ASKED YOU A QUESTION, YOU STATED THAT THE DRIVING PATTERN 
WAS ERRATIC. 
A. THAT'S --
Q. THOSE WERE YOUR WORDS. 
A. THAT'S CERTAINLY A FAIR STATEMENT,, YES. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU ALSO SAID THAT -- THAT THE CAR LEFT THE 
TRAVEL LANE BY A TIRE WIDTH, APPROXIMATELY? 
A. YEAH, THAT'S -- THAT'S WHAT I CLAIM. 
Q. AND THAT HE BROKE THE CENTER LINE DIVIDER. WHEN YOU 
STATED THAT HE BROKE THE CENTER LINE, DOES THAT MEAN HE 
ACTUALLY CROSSED THE LINE? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT, BY ABOUT A WHEEL LENGTH. 
Q. OKAY. SO WHEN YOU -- WHEN YOU SAY THAT HE LEFT THE 
TRAVEL LANE, YOU'RE SAYING THAT HE WENT TO THE CENTER ONTO 
THE CENTER LINE --
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. -- BECAUSE THERE'S NO LINE ON THE RIGHT. 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. OKAY. I NOTICE IN YOUR REPORT WHICH YOU WROTE, I'M 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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AND OUT OF THE DESIGNATED TRAVEL LANE. I HAVE A VERY 
SPECIFIC MEMORY OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE. 
Q. OKAY. SO YOU -- YOU'VE STOPPED -- YOU JUST STATED THAT 
YOU'VE STOPPED OVER HUNDREDS OF VEHICLES SINCE THIS TIME, 
BUT YOU CAN REMEMBER THINGS ON THIS CASE THAT YOU DIDN'T 
INCLUDE IN YOUR REPORT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YOU BET. 
Q. OKAY. SO YOU -- I MEAN, YOU PICK WHAT -- YOU PICK AND 
CHOOSE WHAT YOU WANT TO INCLUDE AND JUST REMEMBER THE REST 
FOR WHEN YOU COME TO TESTIFY? 
A. NO, SIR. 
Q. OKAY. IF WE COULD MOVE ON TO SOMETHING ELSE HERE. 
A. THANK YOU. 
Q. YOU STATED THAT YOU FOLLOWED HIM AND HE SLOWED DOWN TO 
PULL INTO HIS FRIEND'S DRIVEWAY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. WELL, I CERTAINLY DIDN'T KNOW THAT IT WAS HIS FRIEND'S 
DRIVEWAY AT THAT POINT, BUT HE DID SLOW DOWN. 
Q. NOT AT THAT TIME, BUT YOU NOTICED THAT HE SLOWED DOWN 
AND PULLED INTO A DRIVEWAY? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU'VE STATED THAT HE ONLY SLOWED DOWN FOR 
LIKE 2 0 TO 3 0 YARDS? 
A. YEAH, ROUGHLY. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, THE ROAD -- I'M TRYING TO GET A PICTURE. 
HOW WIDE IS THE ROAD -- THE SHOULDER .WHERE HE PULLED OFF TO 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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WHERE YOU WERE FOLLOWING BEHIND HIM? WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET 
AT IS, IS THERE ENOUGH ROOM FOR YOU TO SAFELY PASS THE CAR 
IF HE PULLS OFF TO THE SIDE? 
A. OH, YEAH. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. YEAH. 
Q. SO HE MAY HAVE PULLED INTO THE DRIVEWAY THOUGH --OR YOU 
SAID THAT HE PULLED INTO THE DRIVEWAY AND REVERSED OUT AND 
PARKED. 
A. UH-HUH. I DID. 
Q. OKAY. AND THEN YOU STATED THAT HE PARKED ON TOP OF THE 
CURB. 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. OKAY. NOW I'M LOOKING AT YOUR REPORT AGAIN AND IT SAYS 
THAT THE -- THE SEDAN CORRECTED OUT OF THE DRIVEWAY AND 
PULLED UP TO THE CURB AND STOPPED. THERE'S NO MENTION IN 
YOUR REPORT THAT HE PULLED UP ON THE CURB. IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. (NO RESPONSE.) 
Q. MY QUESTION IS, THERE'S NO MENTION THAT HE'S PARKED ON 
THE CURB; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. I SEE THAT, YES. 
Q. SO THAT --IS THAT CORRECT? YES? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT WHAT THAT SAYS, YES. 
Q. OKAY. THAT THERE'S NO MENTION THAT HE PARKED ON THE 
CURB. 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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Q. ON WHAT BASIS DID YOU SUSPECT THAT THERE WOULD BE 
ALCOHOL IN THE CAR AFTER YOU HAD -- LET ME REPHRASE THAT. 
YOU HAD JUST COMPLETED THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. AND HE HAD PASSED THOSE. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU CONCLUDED THAT HE WASN'T DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND -- AND PRIOR TO DOING ALL OF THAT, YOU HAD SMELLED 
THE ODOR OF ALCOHOL. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU DIDN'T INQUIRE AS TO WHY -- WHEN HE HAD HIS LAST 
DRINK. 
A. NO. 
Q. AND YOU DIDN'T INQUIRE WHERE HE HAD HIS LAST DRINK. 
A. NO. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU DID NOT NOTICE ANY IMPAIRMENT ON MR. 
TRUJILLO. 
A. NO, NOT -- NOT TO SPEAK OF, NO. 
Q. OKAY. AND IT'S AT THIS POINT THAT YOU SAY TO YOURSELF, 
YOU HAVE A CONCERN THAT HE DRANK ALCOHOL -- AND I'M NOT SURE 
WHERE THIS ALL COMES INTO, BUT YOU STATED THAT HE WORKED FOR 
SMITH'S, THAT HE SAID HE DRANK ALCOHOL,' AND SOMEWHERE YOU 
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PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER THAT THERE MAY BE AN OPEN CONTAINER 
IN THE VEHICLE? 
A. IS THAT A QUESTION? I'M SORRY. 
Q. WELL, I'M -- I'M ASKING -- YOU STATED -- AND YEAH, IT IS 
A QUESTION BECAUSE I'M NOT UNDERSTANDING YOUR TESTIMONY. 
YOU STATED THAT YOU HAD A CONCERN WHERE THE ALCOHOL WAS 
BECAUSE SMITH'S IS A SECURE FACILITY. AND SO I GUESS MY 
QUESTION IS, YOU HAD A CONCERN, BUT YOU NEVER QUESTIONED HIM 
WHEN HE HAD A DRINK; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. I THINK MY CONCERN WAS GOING TO BE ANSWERED THROUGH A 
BRIEF LOOK IN THE VEHICLE, WHETHER THERE WAS AN OPEN 
CONTAINER, BECAUSE I REALLY DIDN'T -- I MEAN --
Q. BUT I -- MY QUESTION IS, YOU HAD A CONCERN THAT THERE 
WAS AN OPEN CONTAINER --
A. UH-HUH. 
Q. -- BUT YOU NEVER ASKED HIM WHEN HE HAD A DRINK; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. AND YOU NEVER ASKED HIM WHERE HE HAD THE DRINK? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. SO HE HAD --HE TOLD YOU HE HAD ONE DRINK. THAT COULD 
HAVE BEEN 5 O'CLOCK THAT EVENING. 
A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO YOU, SIR, AND YOUR CLIENT, I'M 
NOT SURE THAT THOSE QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE ALLEVIATED THE FACT 
THAT I WAS STILL CONCERNED THAT THERE1 MAY BE AN ALCOHOLIC 
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